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While the number of established maritime boundaries steadily increases, there are many situations where delimitation disputes between 
neighboring States remain unsettled. In the latter situation, States may face the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit that is located in an area 
where their maritime claims overlap. The presence of such a deposit inevitably creates a range of intricate legal (and political) issues. One of 
the issues is related to the question of whether States can unilaterally authorize hydrocarbon activities with respect to this deposit and, if so, 
what type of conduct is allowed in undelimited maritime areas. This article seeks to provide an answer to these questions. 




States usually conduct hydrocarbon activities in undelimited maritime areas under two 
scenarios. Under the first scenario, States may conclude an interim arrangement that would 
make exploration and/or exploitation of petroleum resources possible.2 Examples include 
provisional arrangements signed in the Gulf of Guinea between Nigeria and São Tomé and 
Príncipe,3 in the Timor Sea between Australia and Timor-Leste,4 and in the Gulf of Thailand 
between Malaysia and Thailand.5 The second scenario relates to the situation where States 
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Constantinos Yiallourides, “State responsibility for unilateral hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas”, 
The JCLOS Blog, 23 November 2017, available at: http://site.uit.no/jclos/files/2017/11/JCLOS-Blog-
231117_Ghana-blog_final.pdf, accessed on 28 May 2018. 
2 It is worth noting that States may also agree on a moratorium on all or some petroleum operations within an 
undelimited maritime area. For example, Israel and Lebanon appears to conduct no hydrocarbon activities in a 
clearly defined disputed area between them in the Levant Sea. Prior to a delimitation agreement concluded in 2010 
between Norway and Russia (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway concerning 
maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, 15 September 2010, 
2791 UNTS 36 (entered into force 7 July 2011)), there was also a moratorium on all petroleum operations in an 
area of overlapping claims in the Barents Sea. 
3 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe on the 
Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the 
Two States, Abuja, 21 February 2001, reproduced in Jonathan I. Charney, David A. Colson and Lewis M. 
Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. 5, 2005, pp. 3649-3682 (entered into force 16 January 
2003). 
4 Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia, Dili, 20 May 2002, 
2258 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 April 2003). It is important to note that in March 2018, Australia and Timor-
Leste concluded a new treaty establishing the maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea. The text of this Treaty is 
available at: http://dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/Documents/treaty-maritime-arrangements-australia-timor-
leste.pdf, accessed on 28 May 2018. Pursuant to article 9, the previous agreements, including the Timor Sea Treaty 
of 2002, will cease upon the entry into force of the new Treaty. The new Treaty has also significant implications 
on the management of petroleum resources in the Timor Sea. 
5 Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the 
Constitution and Other Matters relating to the Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, Kuala 
Lumpur, 30 May 1990. The Agreement’s text is available at the Joint Authority’s webpage: 
https://www.mtja.org/rules.php, accessed on 28 May 2018. Prior to the Agreement, the States signed a 
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unilaterally authorize hydrocarbon activities to be carried out in undelimited maritime areas. 
There are a number of examples where States, despite the existence of an area of overlapping 
maritime claims, have unilaterally permitted some exploration and/or exploitation activities in 
such area.6 The Somalia v. Kenya case, which is subject of ongoing litigation before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), is a recent example of the problem of unilateral 
hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas.7 
The main legal issue is what, if any, hydrocarbon activities can be unilaterally conducted in a 
maritime area, the legal status of which needs to be determined and that is not covered by a 
provisional arrangement. Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) contain key rules applicable in areas of overlapping claims to the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.8 Paragraph 3 of these articles provides States 
with two obligations: first, to make every effort to arrive at a provisional arrangement of a 
practical nature, and, second, to make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of 
a future delimitation (the obligation is further referred as an obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper, also known as an obligation to exercise restraint).9 
This article examines the second obligation because, when it is impossible to reach provisional 
arrangements as those mentioned above, this obligation becomes “the only reliable legal device 
that can regulate the conduct of States [in undelimited maritime areas]”.10 The relevance of this 
obligation has increased even more in light of the recent dictum of the Special Chamber (SC) 
in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire that “maritime activities undertaken by a State in an area of the 
continental shelf which had been attributed to another State by an international judgement 
cannot be considered to be in violation of the sovereign rights of the latter if those activities 
were carried out before the judgement was delivered and if the area concerned as the subject of 
claims made in good faith by both States”.11 Thus, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper 
seems to be the main tool to assess the legality of unilateral hydrocarbon operations in 
undelimited maritime area.12 
                                                          
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Joint Authority, Chang Mai, 21 February 1979, 
available at the same webpage. 
6 It is also important to note that there are examples where neighboring States have abstained from/suspended 
hydrocarbon activities in disputed areas, following a mutual agreement or a protest from one of the States. Such 
examples can be found in paras. 9.46-9.48 (with the relevant footnotes) of the Côte d’Ivoire’s Counter-Memorial, 
Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case. The Counter-Memorial is available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/pleadings/Counter_Memorial_final_V
ol.I_Eng_TR.pdf. 
7 Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), ICJ. The latest developments of this case are 
available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/161. 
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994). 
9 Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS: “Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States 
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of 
the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation”. 
10 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, para. 18, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_SepOp_P
aik_orig.pdf. 
11 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23, Judgment, 23 September 2017, para. 592, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf.  
12 See more N. Ermolina and C. Yiallourides, see note *. 
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Although paragraph 3 imposes no moratorium on economic activities in undelimited areas,13 it 
is not altogether clear which types of petroleum activities can be regarded as having the effect 
of jeopardizing or hampering and, therefore, are prohibited. To date, there is only one case, 
Guyana v. Suriname,14 where the Arbitral Tribunal (Tribunal) considered the meaning and 
scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in detail. The SC in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire 
fell short in this respect.15 In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal introduced a standard of 
“permanent physical change to the marine environment”16 that, in general terms, implies that 
activities which satisfy this standard shall not be permitted in undelimited maritime areas and 
those which do not, are to be allowed. Section IV discusses whether the introduction of such a 
standard can provide a certain degree of certainty for coastal States and private petroleum 
companies wishing to undertake exploration and exploitation activities in undelimited maritime 
areas. 
This article begins by determining the temporal scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper (section II). Hereafter, it addresses the obligation’s substantive scope, including its 
judicial consideration (sections III and IV). The standard introduced by the Tribunal in Guyana 
v. Suriname is analyzed in detail. The article also examines the role of provisional measures in 
interpreting of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper (section V). Finally, the article 
concludes by providing some final observations (section VI). 
 
II. THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO 
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER 
 
Paragraph 3 begins with the phrase “pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1”. 
Hereinafter, it introduces a second phrase “during this transitional period”. Logically, the first 
phrase relates to the obligation to enter into provisional arrangements, while the second phrase 
is directly linked to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.17 This section considers the 
meaning of these two phrases. 
 
A. “PENDING [A MARITIME BOUNDARY] AGREEMENT” 
It is unclear when a future delimitation agreement is considered to be “pending”. A number of 
legal commentators have emphasized that the existence of the obligations does not depend on 
whether or not delimitation negotiations have been initiated.18 Indeed, the affirmation that the 
moment of the emergence is somehow associated with the negotiation process may detract from 
                                                          
13 See Youri van Logchem, “The Status of a Rule of Capture Under International Law of the Sea with Regard to 
Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Related Activities”, Michigan State International Law Review, vol. 26, no. 2, 2018, 
pp. 220-221. 
14 Guyana v. Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 17 September 2007, 47 ILM 164, available at: 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/902.  
15 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Judgment, see note 11, paras. 629-634. This issue is also discussed by N. Ermolina and C. 
Yiallourides, see note *. 
16 See Section IV. 
17 David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, “Rights and Obligations in Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims” 
in S. Jayakumar, T. Koh and R. C. Beckman, eds., The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea, Edward 
Elgar, 2014, p. 209. 
18 Rainer Lagoni, “Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements”, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 78, no. 2, 1984, pp. 357 and 364; Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds., United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol. II, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 
815. 
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the significance of these obligations. It is likely there would be a considerable time difference 
between the moments when the negotiations start and when the maritime claims of neighboring 
states (potentially) overlap. Being dependent on whether negotiations have been initiated, the 
obligations would not be in force until the start of negotiations and would cease, if one of the 
parties would have refused to negotiate, or if the negotiations reached a deadlock or were 
discontinued.19 
The point in time at which the obligations stemming from paragraph 3 emerge is generally tied 
to the situation where it is apparent that maritime claims to a particular area do, or might 
potentially, overlap.20 It elicits the question of the circumstances in which the existence of 
overlapping claims becomes clear. Unlike claims to an EEZ, States are not required to make an 
express claim to a continental shelf.21 Undoubtedly, the obligations would arise when 
neighboring States, through diplomatic channels or by other means, have explicitly 
acknowledged that an area of overlapping maritime claims exists, giving rise to a need for 
delimitation.22 
However, there is less clarity in the event when State A has made its claims known or has even 
proceeded to exercise its (alleged) sovereign rights to explore and exploit, while State B has 
raised no objection to that.23 It is reasonable to assume that the absence of reaction does not 
activate the obligations under paragraph 3 because it is unlikely that State A can unilaterally 
identify where exactly maritime claims of State A and State B overlap. The question arises as 
to whether the obligations are triggered when State B, after a certain period of time, starts to 
contest the position or activities of State A (for example, because State A has discovered a 
large-volume petroleum resource or State B due to different reasons has not been able to protest) 
on the basis that State B was not obligated to proclaim its rights over the continental shelf. The 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire case exemplifies this scenario. In that case, Ghana had authorized different 
petroleum operations in a maritime area for a long time before Côte d’Ivoire started to react 
(beginning in 2009). Ghana did so in the belief that a de facto maritime boundary was 
established and Côte d’Ivoire tacitly consented to Ghana’s petroleum activities. Leaving aside 
the SC’s conclusions that there was no tacit delimitation agreement between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire and that Côte d’Ivoire was not estopped from objecting,24 it is notable that the SC was 
of the view that Ghana’s obligation not to jeopardize or hamper clearly arose in 2009 when the 
existence of a delimitation dispute and the location of the disputed area became, or should have 
become, obvious to Ghana.25 In other words, it means that in a similar situation when State B 
breaks its silence and starts to object, State A must pay due attention to the obligations set forth 
in paragraph 3 of the UNCLOS, even if it believes that State B is estopped from objecting. State 
B may indeed have good reasons why it could not react earlier (e.g., internal conflicts that 
prevented State B from focusing on other issues). The subsequent issue relates to the legal 
consequences attached to the moment of the triggering of paragraph 3: for example, whether 
State A would be compelled to halt its hydrocarbon activities in the contested maritime area or 
                                                          
19 R. Lagoni, see note 18, p. 364. 
20 Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas” in C. Schofield, S. Lee and M.-
S. Kwon, eds., The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, Brill, 2014, p. 178. 
21 UNCLOS, see note 8, art. 77 (3). 
22 D. Anderson and Y. van Logchem, see note 17, p. 209. 
23 Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited 
Maritime Areas, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, June 2016, available at: 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/1192_report_on_the_obligations_of_states_under_articles_743_and_833_of_u
nclos_in_respect_of_undelimited_maritime_areas.pdf?showdocument=1, accessed on 28 May 2018  (‘BIICL’s 
Report’), para. 108. 
24 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Judgement, see note 11, Parts VII and VIII. 
25 Ibid., paras. 588, 630 and 631. 
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to share the benefits received prior to State B’s objection. The Ghana v. Côte d'Ivoire case 
demonstrates that it may be difficult to suspend ongoing activities, but that is possible to freeze 
new petroleum activities.26 
The opening phrase of paragraph 3 is also intended to determine the moment of termination of 
the obligation to seek provisional arrangements. The French and Russian texts of the UNCLOS 
clearly refer to the date of conclusion of a delimitation agreement.27 However, it may be a time 
difference between the date of conclusion of a treaty and its date of entry into force.28 Moreover, 
there is always a risk that the adopted delimitation treaty will never come into force. In this 
respect, the rules stemming from the law of the treaties are applicable.29 A delimitation 
agreement may apply provisionally, pending its entry into force.30 Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) imposes upon States an obligation to refrain from 
acts, which might defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force. In other 
words, if a delimitation treaty is signed, but is not yet in force, the Parties to that treaty are 
nevertheless bound by their accord on where the delimitation line lies. Following this logic, the 
obligations under paragraph 3 cease once a final delimitation agreement is reached (as long as 
neither contracting Party attempts to withdraw from that agreement). Thus, paragraph 3 is not 
tied to the date of entry into force of a delimitation treaty.31 
Moreover, it is important to note that the term ‘agreement’ is employed in a broader context, 
covering not only the situation where states have agreed on a maritime boundary, but also where 
the delimitation dispute has been settled by a court or tribunal.32 The question is whether, in the 
latter situation, the obligation would cease once some form of dispute settlement procedure has 
been invoked, or once the court or tribunal has decided that it has jurisdiction, or only when the 
court or tribunal has delivered its final judgement on the merits.33 It seems reasonable to suggest 
that the obligations are terminated once the determination of a maritime boundary is made by a 
judicial body. However, there might be a situation where one of the Parties to a delimitation 
dispute does not accept the final decision.34 In this situation, it is logical to assume that the 
obligations of paragraph 3 continue to apply until the decision is fully implemented. 
                                                          
26 Ibid. See also Section V (D). 
27 UNCLOS, see note 8, arts. 74 (3) and 84 (3). French text: “En attendant la conclusion de l'accord visé au 
paragraphe l, …”. Russian text: “До заключения соглашения, как предусматривается в пункте 1, …”. 
28 Delimitation agreements may enter into force upon signature. However, they are usually subject to ratification 
or approval. See, Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, DOALS, 2000, p. 82; David Anderson, 
“Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements: A Personal View” in R. Lagoni and D. Vignes, eds., Maritime 
Delimitation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 139. 
29 The governing law is Part II of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
30 Ibid., art. 25. For example, a delimitation agreement between the USA and the USSR concluded in 1990 
(Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime 
Boundary, 1 June 1990) is not in force, but the two governments agreed to abide by the terms of that delimitation 
agreement. See, Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
abide by the terms of the Maritime Boundary Agreement of 1 June 1990, pending entry into force, 2262 UNTS 
407. 
31 For example, the Russian text of paragraph 3 refers to “заключенное соглашение”, meaning a delimitation 
treaty concluded between neighboring States, which is different from “действующее соглашение” – a 
delimitation treaty in force – within the meaning of paragraph 4. 
32 UNCLOS, see note 8, arts. 74 (2) and 84 (2). 
33 BIICL’s Report, see note 23, p. 32, para. 109. 
34 For example, Croatia issued a statement declaring that it does not accept the Final Award of 29 June 2017 in 
Croatia v. Slovenia (available at: http://www.mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-releases/,28223.html). The text of the 
Final Award is available at: https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2172. In Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening, Nigeria initially did not accept the Judgement delivered by the ICJ in 2002 (available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/94/094-20021010-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf). The process of the Judgement’s 
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B.  “DURING THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD” 
As regards the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, articles 74 (3) and 84 (3) of the UNCLOS 
stipulate that it lasts “during this transitional period”. The articles provide no explanation of 
what the phrase ‘during this transitional period’ implies. 
The question is when the transitional period ends.35 The logical conclusion is that paragraph 3 
refers to the period until a maritime boundary is agreed by the Parties or is determined by a 
court or tribunal. The SC in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire offered the similar reading of paragraph 3.36 
At the same time, the SC has drawn a distinction between two scenarios within the transitional 
period: the scenario where a provisional arrangement is reached and the scenario where no such 
provisional arrangement exists.37 It is not very clear what the SC desired to show by this 
distinction: whether the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is terminated once a provisional 
arrangement is concluded or whether the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper becomes 
supplementary where a provisional arrangement is in place. The latter interpretation is 
preferable for a number of reasons. 
A provisional arrangement rarely regulates all activities in the disputed maritime area and does 
not always apply to the entire area of overlapping claims. Logically, if a provisional 
arrangement solely covers fisheries activities or a part of a disputed area, the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper would be applicable to other activities, such as hydrocarbon exploration 
and exploitation, or to other parts of the contested area. Against this backdrop, Anderson and 
van Logchem assert that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper applies while a provisional 
arrangement is in place, as well as before such an arrangement is concluded.38 Their approach 
can be supported by the fact that no provisional arrangement can cover all acts which may 
amount to jeopardizing or hampering the reaching a final delimitation. 
Thus, it appears reasonable that the duration of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is 
equated with the temporal scope of the obligation to seek provisional arrangements. In other 
words, the two obligations are triggered once State A has realized that a certain maritime area 
is also claimed by State B and cease when a delimitation agreement (between State A and State 
B) is concluded or when a maritime boundary is established by a judicial body. There is no 
reason to attach a different meaning to the phrase ‘during this transitional period’ only on the 
basis that the period it refers to is already covered by paragraph 3’s opening phrase. 
 
                                                          
implementation took more than 5 years. See in detail Hilary V. Lukong, The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Dispute: 
Management and Resolution, 1981-2011, Langaa Research & Publishing GIG, 2011, chapter 5. In 2010, Cameroon 
and Nigeria signed an agreement on joint development of a number of cross-border petroleum deposits (the text 
of the agreement is not available). See “Cameroon and Nigeria agree joint development along part of their maritime 
boundary”, IBRU news, 15 March 2011, available at: 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=11734&rehref, accessed on 28 May 2018. 
35 The statement of the Conciliation Commission in the case between Timor-Leste and Australia is not very useful 
in this respect. In its decision on Australia’s objection to competence, the Commission stated that the transitional 
period is a period “pending a final delimitation and the provisional arrangements of a practical nature”, para. 97, 
available at: https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1921, accessed on 28 May 2018. 
36 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Judgment, see note 11, para. 630. 
37 Ibid. 
38 D. Anderson and Y. van Logchem, see note 17, p. 209. 
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III. THE CORE CONTENT OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO 
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER 
It is important to note that the requirement to “make every effort” applies not only to the 
obligation to enter into provisional arrangements, but also to the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of a final delimitation.39 Thus, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper 
is an obligation of conduct, not of result.40 In other words, States are solely required “to deploy 
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost” not to jeopardize or 
hamper.41 
Paragraph 3 does not define the terms ‘jeopardize’ and ‘hamper’. According to the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, the verb ‘jeopardize’ means “put (someone or something) into a situation 
in which there is a danger of loss, harm, or failure”, while ‘hamper’ means “hinder or impede 
the movement or progress of”.42 Thus, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper appears to 
mean that States, having overlapping claims regarding a certain maritime area, must take all 
possible measures not to engage in activities that might endanger the reaching of a final 
agreement on delimitation or impede the progress of negotiations to that end.43 
It is clear that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper does not necessarily exclude all 
activities unilaterally conducted within undelimited maritime areas, but rather those that would 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement.44 However, it is completely 
unclear which types of activities are to be regarded as having the effect of jeopardizing or 
hampering. This article addresses the question of what unilateral activities surrounding 
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation is likely to breach the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper.45 
Anderson and van Logchem, and van Logchem writing separately, affirm that the question of 
what type of conduct jeopardizes or hampers can hardly be answered in the abstract. They argue 
that the assessment of whether a particular unilateral action amounts to jeopardizing or 
hampering is subjective.46 This sounds reasonable. However, an international court or tribunal, 
dealing with a (putative) breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, would probably 
apply an objective criterion, as the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname did (or attempted to do).47 
The existence of an objective standard as to what constitutes jeopardizing or hampering is also 
desirable for ensuring the stability of private petroleum companies’ activities in undelimited 
maritime areas and the investment flow. 
 
                                                          
39 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 465; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Judgement, see note 11, para. 629. 
40 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Judgment, see note 11, para. 629. 
41 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area 
(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS Case No. 17, Advisory 
Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, p. 10, para. 110. 
42 BIICL’s Report, see note 23, para. 75. The Report refers to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th edition, OUP 
1999), pp. 759 and 644, respectively. 
43 Ibid., paras. 76-83. This conclusion of the BIICL was also reflected in the Separate Opinion of Judge Paik in 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, see note 10, para. 6. 
44 S. N. Nandan and S. Rosenne, see note 18, p. 815. See also Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 465. 
45 Apart from hydrocarbon activities, the same question can be asked in the context of other unilateral activities 
undertaken in undelimited maritime areas such as fishing, laying submarine cables or pipelines, marine scientific 
research or enforcing national legislation.  
46 D. Anderson and Y. van Logchem, see note 17, p. 206; Y. van Logchem, see note 20, p. 186. 
47 BIICL’s Report, see note 23, para. 85. 
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IV. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO 
JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER IN CASE LAW 
  
The consideration of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is still limited to one case, the 
Guyana v. Suriname case. In Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, the SC touched upon some aspects of the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper without bringing more clarity to the issue of what 
unilateral activities are likely to jeopardize or hamper.48 In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal 
considered the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in the context of the legality of 
exploratory drilling authorized by Guyana in an area where the maritime claims of Guyana and 
Suriname overlapped. The Tribunal adopted a standard of “(permanent) physical change to the 
marine environment” that in general terms implies that activities which satisfy this standard 
shall not be permitted in undelimited maritime areas and those which do not, are to be allowed.49 
This section discusses the question of whether the adoption of such a standard is reasonable 
with respect to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
 
A. THE ADOPTION OF THE STANDARD OF “(PERMANENT) PHYSICAL 
CHANGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT” 
Although the Guyana v. Suriname case concerned exploratory drilling in an area claimed by 
both Parties, the Tribunal made statements of a general character on the question of what types 
of unilateral conduct would breach the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
The Tribunal distinguished two categories of unilateral activities: those that “do not cause a 
physical change to the marine environment” and those that “do cause [such a] physical 
change”.50 The Tribunal further stated that the first category would “generally” not be 
considered as jeopardizing or hampering the reaching a final maritime boundary agreement, 
whereas the second category would have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering.51 The 
Tribunal found support for this distinction in the international jurisprudence of prescribing 
provisional measures, in particular, in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey).52 The 
Tribunal’s reliance on the Aegean Sea provisional measures Order (Aegean Sea Order) elicits 
the questions of whether it was appropriate for the interpretation of the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper and whether it was in line with the current regime of provisional measures.  
It is noteworthy that the Tribunal also introduced an additional element ‘permanent’ into the 
phrase ‘physical change to the marine environment’.53 Arguably, the latter phrase covers the 
range of activities wider than those that falls into the definition of ‘permanent physical change 
to the marine environment’.54 Thus, the word ‘permanent’ logically excludes activities that 
would have only a temporal physical impact on the marine environment.55 
                                                          
48 The Chamber explained the reasons in paras. 632 and 633 of the Judgment.   
49 Apart from the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine environment”, the Tribunal used other 
definitions. See in detail Section IV (A). 
50 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, paras. 467 and 480. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., paras. 468-469. Moreover, in para. 470, the Tribunal stated that such a distinction “is consistent with other 
aspects of the law of the sea and international law”. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Interim 
Measures Order, 11 September 1976, ICJ Reports 1976, p. 3, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/62/062-19760911-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
53 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 467 and subsequently paras. 470 and 481. 
54 Y. van Logchem, see note 20, p. 184. 
55 Ibid. 
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Subsequently, the Tribunal gave four other definitions of activities that are likely to jeopardize 
or hamper. They are: activities with a risk of “physical damage to the seabed or subsoil”;56 
activities that “might affect the other party’s rights in a permanent manner”;57 “activities having 
a permanent physical impact on the marine environment”;58 and activities that “might cause 
permanent damage to the marine environment”.59 
It is apparent that activities affecting the rights of the parties in a permanent way stands out 
from activities having a (permanent) physical change or damage to, or have a (permanent) 
physical impact on, the marine environment. While activities within the latter category are 
broadly similar, although they differ as to the degree of permanency or otherwise of their 
adverse effects, activities in the first category are conceptually quite different.60 However, as 
discussed below, all definitions employed by the Tribunal relate to the provisional measures 
stage and are the necessary requirements for the prescription of provisional measures. Thus, 
contrary to what the Tribunal stated about the difference between the thresholds, it actually 
applied a standard higher than that applicable under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS 
in relation to jeopardizing or hampering.61 Therefore, one can conclude that the standard 
adopted in Guyana v. Suriname is too strict in determining whether the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper has been violated. 
Arguably, the question of whether a particular activity jeopardizes or hampers the reaching of 
a final delimitation agreement should be examined not on the basis of its physical effects on the 
seabed or subsoil, but on the basis of its potential adverse effects on the reaching of such 
agreement. Moreover, as further discussed in Section V (D), the requirement of (permanent) 
physical damage does not seem to be the only applicable in assessing a request for provisional 
measures. 
 
B. THE MEANING OF THE STANDARD OF “(PERMANENT) PHYSICAL 
CHANGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT” 
Under the Tribunal’s reasoning, the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine 
environment” appears to be decisive in identifying activities that may jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of a final agreement on delimitation. The Tribunal did not clarify the meaning of this 
standard. However, it is reasonable to assume that the Tribunal meant unilateral activities that 
may result in a (permanent) modification of a physical character of the marine environment and 
its components, including the seabed and subsoil. It is notable that the Tribunal defined the 
marine environment as the object to which physical damage shall not be caused and has thereby 
broadened the scope of the criterion used by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Order.62 The Aegean 
Sea Order refers only to “the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”.63 
                                                          
56 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 469. 
57 Ibid., para. 470. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., para. 481. 
60 Y. van Logchem, see note 20, pp. 184-185; BIICL’s Report, see note 23, para. 88, p. 25. 
61 See Section V (A) in this respect. 
62 See in detail Section V (C). 
63 Aegean Sea Order, see note 52, para. 30. 
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The Tribunal further explained the adoption of the standard by the fact that activities having a 
(permanent) physical change to the marine environment might alter the status quo64 or prejudice 
the position of a party in a delimitation dispute.65 
However, the Tribunal’s explanation is not quite clear. For example, modern seismic 
exploration techniques can provide with an effective means of assessing the resource potential 
of the continental shelf and can reliably inform a State what parts of an undelimited maritime 
area are potentially rich in hydrocarbon resources.66 In an analysis of the Guyana v. Suriname 
Award, Fietta has emphasized that: 
Unilateral seismic exploration could, therefore, in some circumstances, significantly alter 
the status quo as regards the comparative levels of knowledge of two neighboring states 
about the value of all (or part) of a disputed maritime area. Such a disequilibrium in 
knowledge between two states could, in many cases, make a final delimitation agreement 
more difficult to obtain.67 
Thus, while seismic exploration could somehow change the status quo or affect the outcome of 
delimitation negotiations, this activity is unlikely to cause any permanent physical change to 
the marine environment. 
 
C. HYDROCARBON ACTIVITIES THAT (ARE LIKELY TO) FALL UNDER 
THE SCOPE OF THE STANDARD 
In the view of the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname, seismic exploration is not a type of activity 
that might lead to a (permanent) physical change or damage to the marine environment and, 
therefore, “should be permissible in a disputed area”.68 It is important to emphasize here that 
the Tribunal made this statement against the background that neither State had raised an 
objection to seismic testing authorized by the other State in the area of overlapping claims.69  
The Tribunal thus arrived at the conclusion that “in the circumstances at hand”, unilateral 
seismic testing conducted by a party in the disputed area is not inconsistent with its obligation 
not to jeopardize or hamper.70 Following the logic of the Tribunal, it could be argued that in 
certain circumstances, unilateral seismic exploration can nonetheless constitute a breach of the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. The main question is what these circumstances are. 
Even assuming that the legality of seismic exploration in an undelimited area is called into 
question, it is very unlikely that this activity would satisfy the standard of permanent physical 
                                                          
64 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (see note 42) defines ‘the status quo’ as “the existing state of affairs” (in Latin, 
the meaning is ‘the state in which’). Therefore, changing the status quo means an act through which the situation, 
as it currently exists, may alter. 
65 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 480. 
66 Stephen Fietta, «Annex VII arbitration under UN Convention of the Law of the Sea – interstate dispute over 
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf boundaries – primacy of equidistance line – 
circumstances justifying other methods – scope of duty to reach interim agreements and not to jeopardize or hinder 
final agreements – implications for hydrocarbon exploration”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 102, 
2008, p. 127. 
67 Ibid. Fietta has repeated his opinion during the Conference (22 July 2016) launched the BIICL’s Report, Report 
of Conference, p. 30, available at: 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/1296_obligations_of_states_in_undelimited_maritime_areas_final_event_repor
t.pdf?showdocument=1, accessed on 28 May 2018. Anderson, however, did not agree that seismic surveys could 
constitute jeopardizing or hampering since seismic information is not very useful. 
68 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, paras. 467 and 481. 
69 Ibid., para. 481. 
70 Ibid, para. 481. 
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change or damage to the marine environment71 and, thereby, would not amount to a breach of 
the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. Therefore, it remains unclear why the Tribunal, 
instead of adopting a uniform standard that unilateral seismic activity by its very definition is 
allowed in disputed maritime areas, whatever the circumstances, used the phrase ‘should be 
permissible’.72 
Saying that seismic testing does not involve any physical modification of the continental shelf 
and its natural resources, it could nevertheless be argued that this activity may have (although 
not permanent) physical effects on the marine environment (for example, sonic waves can 
negatively impact on the living marine resources, i.e., cause a change of fish migration routes).73 
As regards exploratory drilling, the Tribunal declared that “some exploratory drilling might 
cause permanent damage to the marine environment”.74 However, the Tribunal did not clarify 
what kind of exploratory drilling is likely to fall into this category. It nevertheless appears 
reasonable to assume that any exploratory drilling could result in an irreversible physical 
change to the continental shelf and, hence, should not be permissible in the absence of either a 
delimitation agreement or a provisional arrangement of a practical nature. 
The Tribunal abstained from concluding as to whether unilateral exploratory drilling authorized 
by Guyana in the disputed maritime area was consistent with that State’s obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper and merely alluded to remedies envisaged by Part XV and Annex VII of 
the UNCLOS.75 However, it appears that the authorization of concession holders to carry out 
exploratory drilling in the disputed area was considered by the Tribunal as an act that 
jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final delimitation treaty. Whereas the Tribunal held 
that Suriname breached its obligation to make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of a final agreement by the use of a threat of force against Guyana’s exploratory 
drilling, it also concluded that Guyana violated the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.76 It 
is logical to infer that unilateral exploratory drilling of Guyana was the reason for the latter 
statement. One possible explanation of the Tribunal’s hesitation might be that the Tribunal 
decided to attribute the area where Guyana’s drilling took place to Guyana.77 
Unlike seismic exploration and some exploratory drilling, the Tribunal stated that unilateral 
exploitation of oil and gas resources in a disputed area would undoubtedly jeopardize or 
hamper.78 Although neither Guyana nor Suriname had conducted exploitation of hydrocarbon 
reservoirs in the disputed area, the Tribunal found that such activities are to be prohibited, since 
they always lead to a permanent physical change to the marine environment.79 
 
                                                          
71 Y. van Logchem, see note 20, pp. 184-185. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See in detail Constantinos Yiallourides, “Oil and Gas Development in Disputed Waters Under UNCLOS”, UCL 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 5, no. 1, 2016, p. 79; and Constantinos Yiallourides, “Protecting and 
preserving the marine environment in disputed areas: seismic noise and provisional measures of protection”, 
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, vol. 36, no. 2, 2018. 
74 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 481 (emphasis added). 
75 Ibid., para. 482. 
76 Ibid., paras. 486 and 488 (3). 
77 Ibid., para. 451. 
78 Ibid., para. 467. 
79 Ibid., para. 467. 
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V. THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CLARIFYING THE 
CONTENT OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OR 
HAMPER 
 
This section addresses the role of provisional measures in the interpretation of the obligation 
not to jeopardize or hamper. Moreover, this section assists in understanding of what types of 
petroleum activities may justify the prescription of provisional measures. 
 
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGIME OF PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES AND THE OBLIGATION NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER 
The power to prescribe provisional measures is given, for example, to the ICJ and the ITLOS 
under provisions set forth in their constituent instruments.80 There are several requirements that 
must be met in order for these judicial bodies to exercise this power. The next section explores 
these requirements. Although the regime of provisional measures is of a special nature, the legal 
requirements developed by international courts and tribunals for prescribing provisional 
measures may nevertheless provide some assistance in interpreting the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper. In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal heavily relied on the Aegean Sea 
Order when applying articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS.81 
The Tribunal underlined that the “exceptional” power to prescribe provisional measures is 
triggered only when activities carried out in disputed maritime areas might cause irreparable 
prejudice to the rights of the parties.82 However, the Tribunal stated that cases dealing with the 
prescription of provisional measures are informative as to what type of activities “should be 
permissible” in disputed areas pending a delimitation agreement or a provisional arrangement.83 
It automatically means that the informative value of provisional measures is also contained in 
explaining of what activities are to be prohibited in disputed maritime areas. The Tribunal 
further held that activities in respect to which the prescription of provisional measures would 
be justified, “would easily meet the lower threshold of hampering or jeopardizing the reaching 
of a final agreement” on delimitation.84 In other words, the Tribunal characterized the threshold 
for prescribing provisional measures as being higher than the threshold for identifying activities 
that jeopardize or hamper under the meaning of paragraph 3. Despite of this observation, the 
criteria that guided the Tribunal in its analysis of whether a breach of the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper had occurred were those “used by international courts and tribunals in 
assessing a request for [provisional] measures, notably the risk of physical damage to the seabed 
or subsoil”.85 Hence, it is difficult to understand the extent to which the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper actually diverges from the regime of provisional measures.86 Moreover, 
                                                          
80 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 993 (entered into force 24 October 1945), 
art. 41; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 
561 (entered into force 16 November 1994), art. 25. 
81 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, paras. 468-469. A similar approach has been adopted by a number of 
legal scholars long before this Award. See, for example, R. Lagoni, see note 18, pp. 365-366; Masahiro Miyoshi, 
Basic Legal Issues of Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 
Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 1999; David Ong, “Joint Development of Common Offshore 
Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law?”, American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 93, no. 4, 1999, pp. 798-799. 




86 Y. van Logchem, see note 20, p. 187-188. 
Title: Unilateral Hydrocarbon Activities in Undelimited Maritime Areas Author: Natalia Ermolina 
Journal: Indonesian Journal of International Law  Stage: accepted draft, May 2018 
 
 
it leaves open the question of whether activities that would not meet the standard for prescribing 
provisional measures, can nevertheless be regarded as jeopardizing or hampering. 
While the Tribunal blurred the line between the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper and the 
regime of provisional measures, the practice of prescribing provisional measures seems to 
maintain this division watertight. It clearly follows from Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire where the SC 
made no mention of articles 74 (3) and 84 (3) in its Order, although both parties did so in their 
submissions. One possible explanation might be that the Chamber considered these articles 
irrelevant in the context of provisional measures. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire differed significantly from those in Guyana v. Suriname. 
Thus, the conditions for prescribing provisional measures could contribute to the clarification 
of the content of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. The subsequent sub-section 
examines the question of whether and which provisional measures requirements might be 
applicable to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
 
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES TO THE OBLIGATION NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OR HAMPER 
The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals establishes that several legal conditions 
must be met in order to prescribe provisional measures. The first prerequisite for prescribing 
provisional measures is that the relevant court or tribunal must satisfy itself that it has prima 
facie jurisdiction over the dispute.87 Once prima facie jurisdiction is established, the objectives 
pursued by a requested party shall be considered. 
The next two legal conditions under which a court or tribunal can exercise its power to prescribe 
provisional measures are intimately intertwined. One is the requirement of urgency and the 
other is the requirement of a risk that irreparable prejudice might be caused to the rights of the 
parties to the dispute before a final decision on the merits is delivered. Both the ICJ and the 
ITLOS are of the view that provisional measures may be prescribed only if there is “a real and 
imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights of the parties to the 
dispute”.88 Interestingly, neither the ICJ Statute nor article 290 of the UNCLOS refers to the 
concept of irreparable prejudice. Nevertheless, under the regime of provisional measures, this 
concept is generally understood as a harm that cannot be fully compensated by way of financial 
reparations. The standard of urgency implies that there is “the need to avert a real and imminent 
risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to [the] rights at issue before the final decision is 
delivered”.89 
The next legal requirement, which shall be fulfilled for the prescription of provisional measures, 
is that the provisional measures requested by a party must be linked to the rights it claims.90 
Apart from the already mentioned requirements, recently both the ICJ and the ITLOS have 
                                                          
87 See, for example, Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire 
in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23, Provisional Measures Order, 25 April 2015, 
para. 37 (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order); Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures Order, 19 April 2017, para. 17. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See, for example, Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) & 
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional Measures 
Order, 13 December 2013, ICJ Reports 2013, para. 25; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, para. 42. 
90 See, for example, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 
Provisional Measures Order, 8 March 2011, para. 54; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, para. 63. 
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started to apply a new standard: the standard of plausibility.91 The application of the plausibility 
test means that prior to the prescription of provisional measures, a court or tribunal has to satisfy 
itself that the rights, which a party claims on the merits and seeks to preserve, are at least 
plausible.92 
The regime of provisional measures has been established and [and constantly develops] in order 
to preserve the potential rights of the parties to a dispute, pending a final decision on the merits. 
Similarly, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is intended to confine activities for the 
purpose of protecting the putative rights of each party, pending a final delimitation.93 Therefore, 
it could be argued that some requirements existing in the context of provisional measures may 
apply by analogy to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. There are two requirements that 
directly aim at protecting the rights: the requirement of irreparable prejudice and the 
requirement of plausibility. The first requirement seems to be the most applicable to the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
Against this background, the statement of the Tribunal in the Guyana v. Suriname case can be 
recalled. The Tribunal held that activities that would satisfy the condition of irreparable 
prejudice, would automatically constitute a violation of the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper.94 The following sub-sections consider the question of what kinds of hydrocarbon 
activities are likely to result in irreversible prejudice to the rights of parties to a delimitation 
dispute. The content of the irreparability requirement is examined by the example of two 
provisional measures Orders: in the Aegean Sea and Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire cases. Similar to 
Guyana v. Suriname, these Orders deal with the issue of unilateral hydrocarbon activities 
carried out in areas of overlapping maritime claims. As noted above, it is important to bear in 
mind that even if the activities do not involve a risk of irreparable prejudice, they might have 
the effect of jeopardizing or hampering. 
As regards the second requirement (the requirement of plausibility), its incorporation into the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper would significantly limit the scope this obligation. In 
addition to the fact that the plausibility requirement is very controversial and vague, the 
allegation of one State that the rights claimed by other State are not plausible might affect the 
credibility of its own legal position.95 At the same time, the practice of prescribing provisional 
measures has established a low threshold for meeting the plausibility test. For example, in 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, the SC found that Côte d’Ivoire had sufficiently demonstrated that the 
rights it claimed and sought to protect in the disputed area were plausible,96 while at the stage 
of merits the Chamber decided to allocate (most of) the disputed area to Ghana. 
 
                                                          
91 For the first time, this requirement was included in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures Order, 28 May 2009, para. 57. Subsequently, in other Orders indicated 
by the ICJ. At the ITLOS, the requirement of plausibility was for the first time applied in the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire 
Order (see note 87) and subsequently in the Enrica Lexie Order (The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), 
ITLOS Case No. 24, Provisional Measures Order, 24 August 2015, paras. 84-85). See also BIICL’s Report, see 
note 23, para. 129. 
92 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire and Ukraine v. Russian Federation Orders, see note 87, para. 58 and para. 64, respectively; 
Enrica Lexie Order, see note 91, para. 84.  
93 Virginia Commentary, vol. II, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 984. This has been repeated in the BIICL’s Report, 
see note 23, para. 124. 
94 Guyana v. Suriname Award, see note 14, para. 469. 
95 BIICL’s Report, see note 23, para. 133. 
96 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, para. 62. 
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C. THE AEGEAN SEA ORDER 
In the course of litigation on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Greece 
requested the ICJ to indicate provisional measures in respect to unilateral seismic exploration 
authorized by Turkey in areas of the continental shelf claimed by both countries. In particular, 
Greece sought provisional measures requiring Turkey to refrain from all exploration activity or 
any scientific research within the disputed areas in order to preserve the sovereign rights of 
Greece to research, explore and exploit the continental shelf appertaining to it.97 
The ICJ declined to indicate the provisional measures requested by Greece, citing three reasons. 
First, Greece made no claim that seismic exploration undertaken by Turkey – although it 
required small explosions under water for the purpose of sending sound waves through the 
seabed to obtain relevant information concerning its geophysical structure – involved “any risk 
of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”.98 Second, Turkish 
seismic exploration was of a transitory character and did not involve “the establishment of 
installations on or above the seabed of the continental shelf”.99 Third, Turkey did not embark 
upon operations involving “actual appropriation or other use of the natural resources” located 
in the disputed areas of the continental shelf.100 
The ICJ reaffirmed that its power to indicate provisional measures is triggered only when the 
circumstances of a case reveal that there is a risk of an irreparable prejudice to the rights of the 
parties in a dispute.101 However, the Court found that Turkish seismic exploration in the 
disputed areas constituted no risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Greece.102 
The ICJ held that the damage caused by the acquisition of information on the natural resources 
of the disputed areas was compensable, even if the Court, in its judgement on the merits, would 
find that these areas belonged to Greece.103 Judge Stassinopoulos, in his dissenting opinion, 
argued that the gathering of information regarding the resource potential of the disputed areas 
and its possible disclosure created a risk of irreparable harm to the rights of Greece.104 His 
argument sounds reasonable, particularly in light of the Order in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire. 
Although the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order is subject to scrutiny in the next sub-section, it is 
worth noting that the SC has applied an approach slightly different from that of the ICJ in the 
Aegean Sea Order.105 
The ICJ’s reasoning raises the question of whether the Court would have reached a different 
conclusion, had Greece made a claim concerning the harmful nature of Turkish seismic 
exploration. The wording of paragraph 30 seems to imply that if Greece would have provided 
sufficient material to show that Turkish activity had entailed a risk of physical harm to the 
marine environment, it would, arguably, have warranted the indication of provisional measures 
under article 41 of the ICJ Statute.106 Against this background, it is important to emphasize that 
the Court by no means focused on the environmental component of seismic exploration. At the 
                                                          
97 Aegean Sea Order, see note 52, paras. 2 and 15. 
98 Ibid., para. 30 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., paras. 25 and 32. 
102 Ibid., para. 33. 
103 Ibid., para. 33. However, the case was not decided on the merits, as the ICJ found that it lacked jurisdiction. 
See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, 19 December 1978, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3. 
104 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stassinopoulos, p. 38, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/62/062-19760911-ORD-01-09-EN.pdf. 
105 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, paras. 95 and 108 (b). 
106 Aegean Sea Order, see note 52, para. 30: “no complaint has been made that this form of seismic exploration 
involves any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”.  
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time when the ICJ considered the request of Greece, the UNCLOS was not yet adopted.107 
Hereby, the Court was guided solely by the content of article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which does 
not include the protection of the marine environment as its object.  
The other conclusion that follows from the wording of paragraph 30 is that activities involving 
the establishment of installations or the actual exploitation of natural resources of a disputed 
maritime area are likely to be viewed as prejudicing in an irreparable manner. Although Turkey 
conducted no such activities in the disputed areas, it could nevertheless be assumed that if it 
had been the case, the Court would have been able to exercise its power to indicate provisional 
measures. 
Thus, Turkish seismic activities did not meet the condition of irreparable prejudice for the 
granting of provisional measures. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, in paragraph 32 of 
Aegean Sea Order, the Court clearly acknowledged that seismic exploration conducted by 
Turkey without the consent of Greece could possibly cause a prejudice (although not 
irreparable) to the exclusive exploration rights of the latter, should the ICJ uphold the claims of 
Greece on the merits. This suggests that even if such a prejudice would not count as 
‘irreparable’, it could be argued that unilateral seismic exploration in a disputed maritime area 
can nevertheless be categorized as jeopardizing or hampering. As noted above, in respect of the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, the threshold should be lower than the threshold 
justifying the prescription of provisional measures. 
 
D. THE GHANA/CÔTE D’IVOIRE ORDER 
1. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
In accordance with a Special Agreement concluded on 3 December 2014, Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire agreed to submit a dispute concerning delimitation of their maritime boundary to a 
Special Chamber of the ITLOS.108 In the course of the litigation, Côte d’Ivoire filed a request 
for the prescription of provisional measures under article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS with the 
SC.109 
In its request, Côte d’Ivoire raised the issue of unilateral exploration and exploitation activities 
undertaken by Ghana in an area of overlapping claims.110 As indicated in the request, activities 
authorized by Ghana had already gone beyond simple seismic survey of the disputed area.111 
Ghana permitted a number of drilling operations and even moved to the exploitation phase.112 
Therefore, Côte d’Ivoire requested that Ghana be ordered, inter alia, to cease all ongoing oil 
exploration and exploitation activities in the disputed area and abstain from issuing any new 
permits for oil exploration and exploitation in this area.113 
                                                          
107 This also means that some current requirements for provisional measures considered in Section V (B), including 
the requirement of plausibility, were not applicable at that time. 
108 Special Agreement and Notification, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/X001_special_agreement.pdf.  
109 Côte d’Ivoire’s request for the prescription of provisional measures under article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS, 27 
February 2015, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Request_prov_measures_tra
nslation_Reg.pdf. 
110 This area is defined in paras. 60 of the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87. 
111 Côte d’Ivoire’s request, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Request_prov_measures_tra
nslation_Reg.pdf, paras. 10 and 23-27. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., para. 54. 
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In sum, Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire appears to be unusual, although not unprecedented, in terms of 
the significant exploration and investment had occurred in the disputed area before the dispute 
was submitted to the Tribunal.114 The reason for this is that according to Ghana, it has acted in 
the belief that the Parties have mutually accepted and applied a boundary line between them, 
and that for more than 40 years (until 2009), Côte d’Ivoire did not object hydrocarbon activities 
of Ghana and did not inform Ghana of the existence of a different position concerning the 
delimitation issue.115 
According to article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS, pending a final decision on the merits, the SC has 
the power to prescribe provisional measures in order to preserve the respective rights of the 
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. Therefore, a request 
for the prescription of provisional measures shall at least be based on one of the legal grounds 
mentioned in article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS. Côte d’Ivoire in its request argued that provisional 
measures had to be prescribed since there was the need both to preserve the respective rights 
and to protect the marine environment. Côte d’Ivoire claimed that provisional measures were 
required in order to preserve three categories of its “exclusive sovereign rights … arising under 
the UNCLOS”, namely: 
 “the right to explore for and exploit the resources of Côte d’Ivoire’s seabed and the 
subsoil thereof by carrying out seismic studies and drilling, and installing major 
submarine infrastructures” in the disputed area; 
 “the right to exclusive access to confidential information” about Côte d’Ivoire’s natural 
resources in the disputed area; 
 “the right to select the oil companies to conduct exploration and exploitation operations 
and freely to determine the terms and conditions in its own best interest and in 
accordance with its own requirements with respect to oil and the environment”.116 
 
Moreover, Côte d’Ivoire also alleged that oil exploration and exploitation activities authorized 
by Ghana in the disputed area were causing serious harm to the marine environment.117 This 
allegation was used in support of Côte d’Ivoire’s claim under the protection of the marine 
environment vein of article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS. 
 
2. CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE CHAMBER INTO THE IRREPARABILITY 
REQUIREMENT 
When prescribing provisional measures, the Chamber stated that all legal conditions necessary 
for granting of provisional measures had been met.118 This sub-section examines the changes, 
which the Chamber made with respect to the requirement of irreparable prejudice. 
In the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, the SC has confirmed that its power to prescribe provisional 
measures is triggered only when there is a real and imminent risk of causing irreparable 
prejudice to the rights of the parties to a dispute before a final decision on the merits is handed 
                                                          
114 Nigel Bankes, “ITLOS Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures with Respect to Oil and Gas 
Activities in the Disputed Area in Case Involving Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire”, The JCLOS Blog, 12 May 2015, 
available at: https://site.uit.no/jclos/2015/05/12/itlos-special-chamber-prescribes-provisional-measures-with-
respect-to-oil-and-gas-activities-in-disputed-area-in-case-involving-ghana-and-cote-divoire/. 
115 Written Statement of Ghana, 25 March 2015, Section I, subsection B, available at: 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/Vol._I_-
_Written_Statement_of_Ghana_FINAL.pdf. 
116 Côte d’Ivoire’s request, see note 109, para. 53; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, paras. 44-49. 
117 Côte d’Ivoire’s request, paras. 39-53; Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, para. 50. 
118 Section V (B) considers the conditions for the prescription of provisional measures.  
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down.119 The SC held that a risk of irreparable prejudice exists where, in particular, “activities 
result in significant and permanent modification of the physical character” of the disputed area, 
and where “such modification cannot be fully compensated by financial reparations”.120 
Côte d’Ivoire claimed that the continuation of Ghana’s unilateral activities in the contested area 
would cause irreversible damage to its sovereign rights.121 Ghana in its reply stated that the 
harm claimed by Côte d’Ivoire cannot be regarded as “irreparable” because it might be 
addressed through an appropriate award of damages and by delivery of information acquired 
by Ghana.122 
The Chamber agreed with Ghana that “the alleged loss of the revenues derived from oil 
production could be the subject of adequate compensation in the future”.123 However, the 
Chamber took the view that the ongoing exploration and exploitation activities conducted by 
Ghana in the disputed area were of a distinctive character. Such activities were likely to “result 
in a modification of the physical characteristics of the continental shelf”124 and “any 
compensation awarded would never be able to restore the status quo ante in respect of the 
seabed and subsoil.”125 
As regards the exclusive right to access to confidential information about the natural resources 
of the continental shelf, the SC took into account Ghana’s statement that the gathered 
information on the natural resources of the disputed area will be duly recorded and that Ghana 
will be able to provide this information to Côte d’Ivoire, if it will be required to do so at the 
conclusion of the dispute.126 Although the Chamber accepted the undertaking given by Ghana, 
it also held that the right claimed by Côte d’Ivoire required protection.127 
The Chamber stated that “the acquisition and use of information about the resources of the 
disputed area would create a risk of irreversible prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire”, if the 
Chamber, in its judgement on the merits, will rule that all or any part of the disputed area 
pertains to Côte d’Ivoire.128 Therefore, dealing with a matter similar to what was raised in 
Aegean Sea, the Chamber arrived at the opposite conclusion.129 The Chamber’s finding seems 
to imply that the condition of irreparable prejudice can be met even if there is no risk of physical 
change to the seabed and subsoil. Support for this conclusion can also be found in the 
formulation of paragraph 89 of the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, which by the inclusion of the 
adverb ‘in particular’, indicates that the requirement of physical change is not the only one to 
satisfy the condition of irreparable prejudice. 
In sum, the Chamber accepted that the imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the sovereign 
and exclusive rights of Côte d’Ivoire existed.130 In other words, it concluded that the exploration 
and exploitation activities planned by Ghana in the disputed area required prescribing 
provisional measures. At the same time, the Chamber prescribed provisional measures different 
from those requested by Côte d’Ivoire. In doing so, the Chamber relied upon two main aspects: 
                                                          
119 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, para. 74. 
120 Ibid., para. 89. 
121 Ibid., paras. 76-81. 
122 Ibid., paras. 82-87. 
123 Ibid., para. 80. 
124 Ibid., para. 88. 
125 Ibid., para. 90. 
126 Ibid., paras. 92 and 93. 
127 Ibid., para. 94. 
128 Ibid., para. 95. 
129 See Section V (C). 
130 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, para. 96. 
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the preservation of Ghana’s rights and the protection of the marine environment. The Chamber 
stated that in the event that Ghana would be ordered to suspend its activities, especially in 
respect of which drilling had already taken place, it would “cause prejudice to the rights claimed 
by Ghana and create an undue burden on it” and it could also result in a “harm to the marine 
environment.”131 
Such a two-pronged approach can be explained by the wording of article 290 of the UNCLOS. 
Article 290 aims at preserving the respective rights of both parties to a dispute, not only the 
rights of the requesting party. Hence, the SC attempted to reach a delicate balance between the 
competing rights of the parties under the regime of provisional measures.132 The special 
circumstances of Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire should also be borne in mind. It seems that the Chamber 
took into account the fact that Côte d’Ivoire was not particularly active to contest Ghana’s 
petroleum activities in the disputed area before 2009. 
 
VI. FINAL REMARKS 
The Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire case is the second case, following Guyana v. Suriname, in which an 
international judicial body has dealt with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in the 
context of unilateral hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas. Unfortunately, the 
Special Chamber did not address the reasonableness of the standard of “(permanent) physical 
change to the marine environment” developed by the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname. Thereby, 
this standard is still the only applicable in identifying what hydrocarbon activities would have 
the effect of jeopardizing or hampering. When adopting the standard of “(permanent) physical 
change to the marine environment”, the Tribunal heavily relied on the criterion laid down by 
the ICJ in the Aegean Sea provisional measures Order. In the view of the ICJ, activities that 
pose a risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil, or to their natural resources might cause 
irreparable prejudice to the rights, which are the subject of a dispute. The Tribunal modified the 
ICJ’s criterion by including such additional elements as ‘permanent’ and ‘the marine 
environment’. Nevertheless, one can agree with a number of scholars that the benchmark used 
by the Tribunal was not fully justified with respect to the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper.133 The Tribunal should have applied a less strict threshold for finding a violation of the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, rather than the one that is sufficient for triggering the 
power to prescribe provisional measures.  
Moreover, as discussed above, the Chamber in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire seems to have changed the 
content of the irreparability requirement. In the context of the right to information about 
resources of the disputed maritime area, it appears that the Chamber did not consider the 
standard of permanent physical change to the marine environment as a necessary condition to 
meet the irreparable prejudice requirement.134 Thus, the formula provided by the Tribunal in 
Guyana v. Suriname should be revisited in light of the Order in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire. 
                                                          
131 Ibid., paras. 99-101. It is interesting to note that the Chamber, when referring to a risk of prejudice to Ghana’s 
rights, did not consider it as “irreparable”. As regards the second argument against the suspension of Ghana’s 
activities in the disputed area, one can wonder why the Chamber regarded environmental harm resulting from the 
suspension of ongoing activities as more serious than that from the continuation of these activities. 
132 Yoshifumi Tanaka, “Unilateral Exploration and Exploitation of Natural Resources in Disputed Areas: A Note 
on the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order of 25 April 2015 before the Special Chamber of ITLOS”, Ocean Development 
& International Law, vol. 46, no. 2, 2015, p. 326; Stephen Fietta and Robin Cleverly, A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 136.  
133 Y. van Logchem, see note 20, p. 191; S. Fietta, his comments on the BIICL’s Report, see note 67, pp. 21-22. 
134 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, see note 87, para. 95. 
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If one assumes that the standard of permanent physical damage is indeed a rule of international 
law defining what hydrocarbon activities are or are not consistent with the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper, the question is what phases (or techniques used in conducting) of the 
exploration and exploitation are most likely to come under the scope of this standard. The 
standard would definitely apply to activities involving the placement of permanent installations 
and structures on the seabed, or activities aimed at extracting of petroleum resources located in 
areas of overlapping maritime claims. As follows from the discussions in Section IV, any 
drilling operation entails a risk of permanent physical damage to the seabed and subsoil and, 
therefore, would likely to be contrary to the duty not to jeopardize or hamper. The answer to 
the question of the applicability of the mentioned standard to seismic testing is less certain. 
Seismic exploration would hardly meet such a (unreasonably) high threshold for finding a 
breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
It is important to bear in mind that this article concludes that for finding a violation of the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, the application of the standard of “(permanent) physical 
change to the marine environment” is unjustified. The article argues that even if that standard 
cannot be met in the context of a particular hydrocarbon activity, it does not mean that this 
activity is in line with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. As noted above, the emphasis 
should be placed not on the physical effects of a hydrocarbon activity on the marine 
environment and its components, but on its effects on the process of reaching a final 
delimitation agreement between neighboring States. Thus, it could be argued that even seismic 
surveys might constitute jeopardizing or hampering. The seismic information may advantage 
the Party having access to it in delimitation negotiations. The perception of an undelimited 
maritime area as rich in petroleum resources may make it difficult for a State to modify its legal 
position and reach a compromise with the neighboring State. In any case, a State claiming that 
its neighbor’s hydrocarbon operations are contrary to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper 
would need to substantiate the effects of these operations upon the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary between them. 
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